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The magic of Shanghai Pudong
Source: Wikimedia 
ON 1 APRIL 2017, the Chinese Communist Party 
Central Committee and the State Council announced 
the establishment of Xiongan New Area 雄安新区	in 
southern Hebei province, on the historic periphery 
of the Beijing capital region. Despite the anodyne 
category of its name, ‘new area’ or xinqu 新区, it is 
a significant event in the history of China’s urban 
development. The nondescript phrase ‘new area’ 
suggests the magic of Shanghai Pudong, with its 
super-tall financial centre, expansive cultural 
facilities, glittery Oriental Pearl Tower, maglev 
airport train, and Shanghai Disneyland. Pudong, 
the original national-level New Area, rose from 
the eastern bank of the Huangpu River to become 
one of the most successful and spectacular urban 





















































The term New Area is also China’s development-planning language for 
a higher standard of ‘special zone’ 特区, one whose conditions will surpass 
those of the historic special economic zones led by Shenzhen in the 1980s. 
China’s leadership chose the term ‘New Area’ to distinguish Pudong from 
the early manufacturing zones like Shenzhen.1 A New Area has high-tech-
nology industry, a green urban environment, and a spectrum of leisure 
and consumer opportunities. It is a ‘creative city’ with good schools, well 
served by public transportation and connected to regional inter-urban rail 
lines as well as the latest style and standard in high-rise housing, offering 
investors the possibility of making a fortune in real estate. Xiongan is the 
nineteenth state-level New Area but it is also the most important New Area 
since Pudong.
‘No one had ever heard of Xiongan,’ The Economist observed, yet now 
‘it’s the most talked-about place in China.’2 A Google search cannot retrieve 
it on the map of Hebei province — because it does not yet exist on the map. 
Xiongan is a new name for a new administrative division. It merges three 
historic counties — Anxin 安新, Rongcheng 荣成, and Xiongxian 雄县 — by 
abolishing their governments and combining them to establish a new ter-
ritory that will be jointly governed by the Hebei Province Party Committee 
in Shijiazhuang, the provincial capital, the Jing-Jin-Ji Cooperative Develop-
Location of the Xiongan New Area in Hebei province
Image: Wikipedia
ment Leading Small Group, and the State Council. Xiongan combines words 
from Xiongxian and Anxin to form a new place name. Its simplest literal 
translation is ‘powerful peace’. But the word xiong has mutliple meanings in 
history, including male, chieftan, hero, victory, grand, imposing, bold, and 
unconstrained. Named for the Xi Jinping era, Xiongan is the latest example 
of how China changes its subnational territory to establish new cities in a 
process of planned uneven development. 
Xiongan is the focus of a long-term Chinese central government plan 
to redistribute the population and economy from Beijing to surrounding 
areas. The equivalent in Australia would be if Canberra was the size of Bris-
bane, Melbourne, and Sydney combined, and then grew beyond its resource 
limits and the government responded by building an ‘overflow’ city at a 
distance in an adjacent state. Located in the region of Beijing, but not in Bei-
jing, Xiongan is a new city for Beijing. The central government introduced 
new plans for the capital region (as discussed in the China Story Yearbook 
2015), in response to evidence that Beijing had already breached its planned 
growth limits. Its water supply is insufficient for continued population and 
industrial growth. The 2004–2020 Beijing Urban Master Plan projected a 
maximum population of eighteen million, but by 2016 Beijing was home to 
Location of the Xiongan 























































21.5 million. Now the Bei-
jing 2016–2030 plan aims 
to limit the population to 
twenty-three million. To 
alleviate the problems, the 
central government has 
decreed that ‘non-capital 
functions’ 非首都功能, un-
related to Beijing’s status 
of national capital, will be 
relocated outside the city. 
The main solution is the 
Xiongan New Area. 
Construct! 
China debuted the economic development model of production-led 
growth, based on state investment in construction and land development, 
in the 1980s, with China’s opening to the world economy. Xinhua, the state 
news agency, has described Xiongan as a historically strategic decision 
for the Chinese Communist Party that follows in the path of the Shenzhen 
Special Economic Zone — the leading development area of the 1980s — 
and the Shanghai Pudong New Area in the 1990s.3 This official discourse 
works in two ways. Just as Shenzhen represents the Deng Xiaoping era 
and Pudong that of Jiang Zemin, Xiongan New Area is a symbol of the core 
leadership of Xi Jinping. 
Internationally, publicity about the construction of Xiongan contin-
ues the practice that economist Barry Naughton describes as ‘signalling’: 
communicating to world markets that China is in the business of economic 
growth.4 International investment firms calculate that the state will invest 
between two and four trillion yuan (US$290–580 billion) over the next fif-
teen to twenty years in Xiongan. This is good news for China’s steel pro-
duction, which, coincidentally, is concentrated in Hebei province. From 
Main cities of the capital region
Image: people.cn
an initial one hundred square kilometres, Xiongan will expand to 2,000 
square kilometres by 2050. Official publicity calls it a ‘great plan for the 
millennium and a major state project’ 千年大计, 国家大事. 
Environmentally Speaking
Compared to Beijing, Xiongan has ample water resources, at least in the-
ory. Party-state propaganda describes Xiongan’s ‘relatively clean natural 
environment’ including the ‘largest freshwater lake’ in the North China 
Plain. The echo chamber of official media describes the area as ‘ecological-
ly healthy’ because it includes the ‘freshwater lake’ of Baiyangdian, which 
lies at the centre of former Anxin county. Scientific reports about Baiyang-
dian tell a different story. 
Baiyangdian is an inland wetland ecosystem that expands and con-
tracts with the rainy season, the flow of the Hai River that feeds it, and 
the vagaries of the water table. A dian 淀	is a shallow lake emerging in a 
seasonal wetland or marsh. Marshes in China, as elsewhere, were histor-
Map of the administrative division of Anxin county





















































ically treated as swamps and classified as wasteland. Now, however, Bai-
yangdian is recognised as the natural ‘kidney of north China’ for filtering 
the waters of the Hai River and providing habitat for migratory birds in 
the Asian flyway.
The problem is that over the past four decades, Baiyangdian’s ephem-
eral meres and ponds have shrunk by up to one-half of their historic area.5 
More than one hundred dams have been built upriver on the Hai and 
its tributaries for flood control, hydropower, and reservoirs. Significant 
amounts of water are drawn off by industry including by small-scale plas-
tics factories in the area. From 1983 to 1988 Baiyangdian was dry. Since 
the 1950s, annual rainfall has dropped nearly twenty per cent and aver-
age temperature has risen 2.5 degrees centigrade while population has 
doubled. Local farmers have reclaimed former shorelines and extracted 
groundwater for irrigation. And today, like so much water elsewhere in 
China, the marsh has become heavily polluted from local and upstream 
sources. A 2012 Chinese government report found water pollution worse 
Map of the river system of Baiyangdian showing the relationship between the three counties 
Source: Li, Aiguo (李爱国), Baiyangdian Annals (白洋淀志), (中国书店, 1966) 
than grade five or too toxic to touch.6 The Chinese government has sepa-
rately announced a ten-year effort to clean up Baiyangdian, but a reliable 
restoration will take much longer. Only with central government support 
is the Baiyangdian ecosystem likely to be restored. 
Real Estate Fever
The economic transformation of China is a story of industrialisation and 
urbanisation; production and consumption. The processes are mirror 
images. Industrialisation, clawing minerals from the earth to produce ce-
ment and steel for construction, creates the vertical environment of build-
ings and bridges. Urbanisation, meanwhile, paves over natural areas and 
historic places, propels domestic growth, and engages citizens in unprec-
edented levels of consumerism. Since the 1980s, as hundreds of millions 
of people in China have become urban citizens for the first time, their 
dreams for the future are inextricably entwined with the construction of 
cities and the development of new forms of housing for urban lifestyles. 
The Chinese government depends on its citizens to consume the housing 
that it produces, which, in turn, contributes significantly to GDP growth. 
On 23 February 2017, Xi Jinping himself chaired a Xiongan planning 
meeting in Anxi county, the ‘an’ of Xiongan.7 The rush was on: the fantasy 
of real estate prices that could increase ten- or twenty-fold, virtually over-
night, drew an early wave of investors. Local journalists reported a surge 
of cars with out-of-area license plates. But like insider trading in the stock 
market, advance buy-up of real estate skews the market. It contributes to 
the problems of unaffordable housing and socioeconomic inequality that 
Xi, at the Nineteenth Party Congress, would pledge the Party to address. So 
the government changed tack, placing a moratorium on private real estate 
transactions in Xiongan in early April. 
Investors then sought to follow state-owned enterprises into former 





















































government. More than 
sixty enterprises arrived, 
leasing more than twen-
ty per cent of available 
rental housing. Sale and 
rental prices quadrupled. 
In response, on 3 April, 
local governments in the 
former Anxin, Rongcheng, 
and Xiongxian counties 
held an emergency meet-
ing, at which they decided to freeze property market transactions.8 These 
included closing the doors on the sales offices of new property develop-
ments and formal and informal property agencies, and banning sales in 
the secondary housing market — that is, preventing existing owners from 
selling up. In response to announcements published by The Housing and 
Urban Construction Bureau, buyers, sellers, and brokers congregated out-
side shuttered property offices, conducting their own informal arrange-
ments. Public security arrived and made arrests to demonstrate the ban 
was a serious one. Government-controlled rental agencies took over.9 
Local governments also introduced new controls over the right to 
residency in the New Area. Determining who is a ‘local’, and who is en-
titled to an official resident permit, or hukou 户口, in any city in China 
can be a complex procedure. Policies can change in step with local politi-
cal-economic plans and targets. Staff of the former Xiongxian government 
reported that local hukou quota and temporary migrant worker permits 
had been frozen in advance, in 2016, to prevent a flood of workers from 
outside the area.10 In the first week of April, the government suspended 
processing marriage dissolution applications because ‘single’ people can 
each buy one house.11 The new controls also affected local people who had 
moved away temporarily for work, military service, or education. With 
their hukou status ‘frozen’ 冻结, they found themselves cut off from home. 
People congregating outside shuttered real estate offices
Photo: Cui Meng, Global Times
The Xiongan plan, based on government acquisition of farmland and 
the resettlement of farmers, is always a sensitive issue. In September 2017, 
the first land compensation contracts were signed with 240 village house-
holds for a 1000 mu (66.7 ha) development site.12 Some local villages traced 
their history back to the Ming dynasty (1644–1911); they had been on alert 
since receiving orders at the end of 2016 to suspend planting. The plan 
mandates land in the Xiongan New Area be treated as a ‘security zone’ 
so that it can serve as ‘a blank slate’ 一张白纸.13 To block new land devel-
opment, and prevent expansion of or additions to existing housing, local 
governments set up checkpoints at the entrances to villages in order to 
intercept construction materials. The reason people may be tempted to ex-
pand homes slated for demolition is that when local residents are required 
to move for state development projects, the size of their existing housing 
determines the amount of compensation. 
Building Cities for Beijing
Like Beijing in the urbanising North China Plain, the world’s largest cities 
typically form city-regions. Yet the difference in China is territorial ad-
ministration based on Party governance of administrative areas.14 Three 
administrative divisions form the capital region of China: Beijing, Tian-
jin, and Hebei, known as Jing-Jin-Ji. (See the China Story Yearbook 2015: 
Pollution, Chapter 5 ‘The City That Ate China — Restructuring & Reviving 
Beijing’, pp.179–201.) Beijing and Tianjin are large ‘province-level cities’ in 
China’s administrative system. Hebei is a province, which forms a collar 
around Beijing to the north, south, and west. In this system, attempts to 
solve developmental problems, like hazardous air pollution, water short-
ages, overcrowding, traffic congestion, and high housing costs, necessari-
ly take place through reforms enacted by governments of administrative 
areas. But when policy reforms — such as the Beijing Urban Master Plan 





















































government steps in to assess how changing administrative divisions can 
address the problems. 
Establishing Xiongan within Jing-Jin-Ji to relocate people, industry, 
and institutions also has a partner city in the process. Thirty kilometres 
east of central Beijing lies Tongzhou, the site of relocation of the Beijing 
municipal government (see the China Story Yearbook 2015: Pollution, 
Chapter 5 ‘The City That Ate China — Restructuring & Reviving Beijing’, 
pp.196–199.) The government of the city of Beijing is departing the centre 
of Beijing! The combination of Xiongan, to the south-west and Tongzhou 
to the east should relieve Beijing of some of its congestion, and with it, en-
vironmental stress, leaving the historic centre of the capital to the central 
organs of Party and state and institutions that serve the central govern-
ment officials, including high-ranking research institutes and hospitals. 
The plan projects a future Beijing as a consummately civilised centre of 
state and society, decorated by historic sites and monuments. 
Beyond that, the basis for deciding who and what will stay in Beijing 
is not clearly defined, but the term ‘non-capital function’ has come into 
use to indicate organisations that will be obliged to move, with their per-
sonnel, to outlying areas. The Minister of the National Development and 
Reform Commission, He Lifeng 何立峰,	has identified ‘the root’ of Beijing’s 
problems is in its ‘having taken on too many non-capital functions’.15 In 
addition to the municipal government, non-capital functions include state-
owned enterprises, wholesale markets, financial institutions, and some 
hospitals, colleges, and research centres — any of whose activities are 
not ‘core’ functions of the capital. Plans also include the decanting of the 
elderly population into hospital-run, relatively low-cost nursing homes in 
surrounding areas.16 Meanwhile, historic Beijing is set to become the core 
city for the core leadership. 
The future of Beijing is thus inextricably tied to Hebei province. 
Yet Hebei has historically been less developed than Beijing and Tian-
jin, with numerous relatively impoverished areas. Support for He-
bei’s development is evident in, among other things, the plan for 
the 2022 Winter Olympics: Zhangjiakou 
张家口, in northern Hebei, is one of the 
main sites. Shifting Beijing’s non-capital 
functions to Hebei will also increase in-
vestment in the region and improve socio- 
economic conditions, in the process redraw-
ing the economic map of the capital region. 
The plan seeks to integrate and balance the 
city-region by linking Hebei, via Xiongan, 
to Beijing. Similar to the new ‘metropolises’ 
of Nanjing-Shanghai-Hangzhou and Shenzhen-Guanghzou-Zhuhai, Jing- 
Jin-Ji region is to become a ‘world-class metropolitan area’.
Xiongan New Area is situated between major cities. The planned high-
speed rail system promises residents of Xiongan a thirty-minute commute 
to Beijing, Tianjin, or Shijiazhuang. Xiongan is also in sightlines of the new 
Beijing Daxing International Airport under construction forty-six kilo-
metres south of Beijing. With Beijing International reaching full capacity, 
this is another way that Hebei is providing a major ‘capital function’ for 
the region. 
What is left unspoken is the difficulty of persuading residents of the 
great capital to relocate. Plan narratives follow a predictable pattern: offi-
cial announcement, resounding confirmation in domestic media, followed 
by repetitive circulation in the international press (selectively reported 
back in Chinese media to reinforce the domestic message). Periodic re-
ports of ‘progress’, ‘advancement’, and ‘speeding up the construction’ help 
maintain a sense of pace. Such publicity also aims to persuade people to 
do their part. The Party-state needs to keep the narrative unblemished, 
entraining the interests of all parties, domestic and international. It scrubs 
alternative views from the Internet and other forums — but not always 
before they have attracted attention.
On 23 July 2017, a blogger writing under the pseudonym Zhang Wu-























































‘Beijing has 20 million people pretending to live here’. It quickly went vi-
ral. ‘For ten years,’ Zhang wrote, ‘Beijing has been controlling housing, 
controlling traffic, and controlling the population.’ New controls for the 
‘world-class city’ include closing down the neighbourhood shops and 
restaurants that made Beijing a liveable city (see Information Window 
above). The idea that people are dispirited, only ‘pretending to live’ in 
Beijing, challenges the official narrative. Zhang continues in his sardonic 
vein, ‘Beijing is a tumour, and no one can control how fast it is growing. … 
Beijing is a believer, and only Xiongan can bring salvation’.17  
‘HOLES-IN-THE-WALL’ 
by Zhang Yichi
One morning in March 2017, 
builders began bricking up the 
entrance of a restaurant in 
Shetan Backstreet 沙滩后街, 
east of Jingshan Park 景山公园, 
the historic centre of Beijing. 
Soon, the brick wall sealed off 
the whole restaurant and the 
owner was forced to close his 
business. Over the following two 
weeks, sixty-one storefronts on 
this 323-metre-long street were 
sealed up as part of a campaign to clean up ‘hole-in-the-wall’ businesses 开墙破洞 through-
out the city. 
In the beginning of 2017, the Beijing Municipal Government launched a three-year  
project on the urban landscape to ‘alleviate, renovate, and hasten improvement’ 疏解整治促
提升. The goal was to disperse activities and enterprises not related to the city’s function as 
a national capital. Eliminating holes-in-the-wall was intended to help ‘beautify’ the streets, 
with the municipal government planning to clean up around sixteen thousand ‘holes-in-
the-wall’ in 2017.
Hole-in-the-wall storefronts came about as the result of the urban evolution of Bei-
jing. From the early 1990s, some residents, as well as dislocated workers, converted their 
dwellings into storefronts by making a hole in the wall. These businesses provided many 
of the daily requirements of local residents: groceries, tobacco, jianbing 煎饼 (Beijing-style 
crepes), and traditional staples such as steamed breads and sesame buns. They also served 
as barbershops, nail salons, breakfast restaurants, acupressure massage places, bars, and 
so forth — filling a gap in urban planning and adding convenience to everyday life. 
A ‘Hole in the Wall’ due for demolition (拆)
Photo: Marco Verch, Flickr
Despite their popularity, these storefronts occupied a legal grey zone, sometimes clearly 
violating planning and hygiene laws, and the city authorities saw them as eyesores. Some 
encroached onto streets, occupying public spaces, and the construction of others affected 
the integrity of existing building structures, harmed heritage architecture or created fire 
dangers. Local governments have been attempting to regulate these storefronts since 2012: 
the district governments of Chaoyang 朝阳 and Dongcheng 东城 bricked up 2,560 and 357 
storefronts respectively between 2014 and 2016.
But this campaign is not just about beautifying the city and eliminating potential safety 
hazards. These storefronts constitute low-end industries and most of their current opera-
tors are migrants from the provinces. The authorities hope that by closing their businesses, 
people will have to move out of Beijing, relieving population pressure in the capital. Accord-
ing to the Beijing Urban Master Plan (2004–2020) , the size of Beijing’s population was to be 
stabilised at around eighteen million by 2020. However, the city’s population reached 19.61 
million in 2011, according to official census figures, endangering the success of the master 
plan. So, at the start of the year, the government closed down migrant-dominated wholesale 
markets and followed up by closing hole-in-the wall shopfronts. 
As expected, this clean-up did force some migrants from Beijing. But it has been incon-
venient for local residents, who can no longer obtain daily necessities from nearby vendors. 
Furthermore, the demolition was carried out in such haste that they left patches of bricked-
up walls that are eyesores in themselves. 
The root of this conflict is the growing contradiction between ideas about how Beijing 
should function as a city. On the one hand, Beijing is the national capital, the political centre 
of China, and the home of national institutions from the National People’s Congress that 
meets in the Great Hall of the People to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It is also a 
centre of learning, home to some of China’s most famous universities, including Peking Uni-
versity and Tsinghua. On the other hand, Beijing, like any city, needs low-end industries and 
residential services. As urban planners tussle with these competing needs, the residents 
of Beijing just have to live with inconvenience as they see their favourite holes-in-the-wall 
disappear one by one.  
One of Xi Jinping’s main themes is the China Dream. But, Zhang writes, 
that those who are truly pursuing their dreams are ‘escaping’ to Australia, 
New Zealand, and the West Coast of the United States. Others have ‘lost hope 
of chasing their dreams’ entirely. State media denounced the blog post, even 
as censors removed it from sight. Netizens countered that they were sick of 
all the stress on ‘dreams’ when their reality was economic hardship and so-
cial inequality.18 Xiongan is but the latest repository of the Party-state’s offi-
cial ‘dreams’. In reality, Xiongan represents a new case of how China chang-





















































The Xiongan Future 
Popular writing on China often modifies the word ‘city’ with terms includ-
ing ‘mega-’, ‘ghost’, and ‘global’ in attempt to capture the size, scale, and 
mystery of their conditions. The announcement of a new ‘zone’ or ‘area’ 
sets off a frenzy of friendly media stories about China’s latest mega-pro-
ject. But the media rally around a project such as Xiongan, a veritable cam-
paign, masks the realities of local conditions. 
Although official media rhetoric likens Xiongan New Area to Shen-
zhen and Pudong — the latter two have different origins, conditions, func-
tions, and goals. Shenzhen was Deng Xiaoping’s first showcase for eco-
nomic reform. Pudong was Jiang Zemin’s flagship project. Xiongan is Xi 
Jinping’s signature project, but unlike the other two it is a project directly 
guided by the CCP Central Committee. This is first time that a ‘New Area’ 
has been officially aligned with the Central Committee. The governing re-
lations over Xiongan heighten its political importance and lend support to 
its economic development.
As Politburo member and Vice Premier Zhang Gaoli 张高丽 explained 
in an interview with Xinhua News Agency, the state media: 
The establishment of Xiongan New Area is a major decision made by 
the Party Central Committee led by General Secretary Xi Jinping, the 
core [of the Party]… This project, personally designed, planned, and 
put forward by Xi, fully reflects the strong mission, far-reaching stra-
tegic vision, and superb political wisdom of Xi, who devoted a lot of 
effort to the project … Since the 18th Party Congress … General Secre-
tary Xi has been deeply involved in the investigation and study of the 
Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei region, and has presided over multiple meetings 
...  In each and every stage of the decision-making, General Secretary 
Xi presided over every important meeting, made important instruc-
tions, and assigned every task personally.19 
Whether Xiongan New Area, Pudong New Area, or Shenzhen Special 
Economic Zone, all ‘zones’, ‘areas’, or ‘districts’ remain administrative divi-
sions in China’s system of subnational territory. They may be ‘special’ but 
they are not are exceptional: they are not separate from the system — they 
are basic to it. Shenzhen was a swath of farmland along the Hong Kong 
boundary, and Pudong was farmland on the outskirts of Shanghai, origi-
nally less than half its present size. As their economies grew, the Party-state 
approved their territorial expansion. Xiongan, by comparison, starts off 
encompassing three counties and envisions its future. 
Conclusion
Xiongan is a key piece of the puzzle of Beijing’s integration with surround-
ing Hebei province and the port city of Tianjin. In September 2017, the 
Xiongan New Area management committee approved its first group of 
companies: fourteen information technology firms, fifteen finance com-
panies, five green technology firms, and seven research institutes. They 
include Alibaba, Baidu, China Mobile, China Telecom, Jingdong Finance, 
360 Qihoo, Shenzhen Kuang-Chi, Tencent, and the People’s Insurance 
Company. Nineteen are central state enterprises, led by the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Committee — the economic arm of 
the State Council.20 Represented by leading state firms, the development 
of Xiongan departs from the market-based evolution of Shenzhen capi-
talised by Hong Kong industry. In planning theory, Xiongan is a ‘growth 
pole’ from which a new sub-regional economy will radiate, at the centre 
of a ‘transportation circle’, networking the old and new cities of Hebei, 
through development of advanced industries, to the larger capital region. 
Xiongan’s growth will be led by state investment. Xiongan, a semi-ru-
ral area with relatively low population density, lets the government keep 
land compensation and relocation costs at a minimum. Like other prefer-
ential development areas, it has access to significant central government 





















































of getting rich quick. Yet unlike Shenzhen and Shanghai, Xiongan does 
not share a border with a dynamic developed city: it cannot benefit from 
direct ‘spillover’ effects. Xiongan also takes a different approach to the 
dream, by imposing strict controls on property, residential permits, and 
company investment. Xiongan is an unprecedented high-level political 
DOCKLESS BIKE, REGULATED CITY, by Gao Yu 
In April 2016, a new type of shared bicycle, the dockless or stationless bike, appeared on the 
streets of China’s major cities. Use requires downloading a smartphone app and then using 
the app to find, unlock (and later) lock the bike, paying via e-pay. They are very cheap — 
between five jiao to one yuan per half hour. Compared to the shared bike systems in Euro-
pean cities, which require the return of bicycles to a dock or station, dockless bikes offer 
flexibility and accessibility. The GPS in the electronic lock indicates the location of the bike, 
and users can park them almost anywhere. 
In Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shenzhen, the number of share bikes has risen 
quickly to about one million in each city, and numbers are growing in many second-tier 
cities as well. Within a year the bikes have attracted more than seventy million users. Mo-
bike is the largest operator among more than thirty bike-share companies competing in the 
Chinese market. Headquartered in Beijing, it received more than one billion US dollars in 
investment from local and overseas venture capital firms.21  
In 2016, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and Ministry of 
Transportation proposed the ‘Scheme for Advancing Internet and Convenient Transporta-
tion and Accelerating Smart Transportation Development’, as part of the national blueprint 
for transportation development. Based on the principles of transport being ‘innovative, co-
operative, green, open and shared’, dockless bikes are a perfect fit for the scheme. In a 2017 
report on the Scheme, the NDRC designated a specific function for dockless bikes to fill the 
gap in the ‘last-one-kilometre’ of the transportation system.22 This function is being met 
according to Mobike’s data, which shows that in Beijing, eighty-one per cent of its dockless 
bikes are activated around bus stops and forty-four per cent between metro stations, with 
similar figures for Shanghai as well.23  
Millions of dockless bikes in use across China demonstrate the success of this new com-
mercial mode of bike sharing. Yet the excitement of novelty and convenience has gone hand 
in hand with worries about safety and the potential for chaos in the cities. People can ride 
the bikes anywhere, including on walkways, and neither lights nor helmets are required. 
An eleven-year-old was hit and killed by a bus while riding a dockless bike that he had sto-
len on a busy road in Shanghai in 2017. His parents sued the bike’s company, demanding  
RMB8million (approximately AU$1.5 million) compensation, alleging the bikes are too easy 
to unlock. The bikes have also led to other sorts of problems. On a long weekend in Shen-
zhen, for example, people randomly parked the dockless bikes along the beach walk, block-
ing the seashore and creating serious congestion (see photo). In other cities, broken bikes 
pile up like mountains, damaging the ‘civilised landscape’ 文明城市形象. Others have been 
destroyed or stolen, found in rivers or stashed in trees.     
City governments have already taken action in response to these problems. In August 
2017, twelve municipal governments, including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Shen-
zhen, strictly banned companies from adding to the existing stock of dockless bikes. This 
regulation is not new or exclusive to dockless bikes. Since the 1980s, many municipal gov-
ernments have banned motorcycles in cities due to concerns both for safety and their 
contribution to air pollution. Dockless bikes provide local transport in some cities where 
electrobikes 电动车	are also banned, as in Guangzhou and Shenzhen. As the main mode of 
point-to-point urban transportation, dockless bikes are likely to be subject to further regu-
lations and controls in the future.
Despite these challenges, Mobike has already become an international firm, expanding 
its operations to Singapore, Manchester, Florence, Milan, Bangkok, Sapporo, and London. 
The success of the smartphone-linked dockless bikes in China has motivated other compa-
nies around the world to enter the market. A Singaporean company called Obike launched 
dockless bikes in Melbourne in June 2017. The same month, Chinese entrepreneur Donald 
Tang, a graduate of the University of Technology, Sydney, imported 160 dockless bikes from 
China, established a dockless bike company called Reddy Go, and planned to have 6,000 
bikes in Sydney by Christmas 2017. Controversies, similar to those in Chinese cities around 
abandoned and carelessly parked bikes are simmering, but have not halted the march of 




project, with no timetable for completion, but it has not demonstrated the 
next step in market-led reform. Whether Xiongan succeeds, ‘depends on 
how big the efforts, how firm the resolution and how forceful the monitor-
ing mechanism can be’. Given that Xi Jinping is so personally invested in 
the project, one can assume these will be substantial. 
This text is taken from China Story Yearbook 2017: Prosperity, 
edited by Jane Golley and Linda Jaivin, published 2018 by ANU Press, 
The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
doi.org/10.22459/CSY.04.2018.06
